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Pakistani defense expenditures and 
the macroeconomy: alternative 
strategies to the year 2000 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Introduction 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating resource situation caused a 
financial crisis, many remnants of which still exist today. In 1988, the Govern-
ment's budget deficit reached 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation 
accelerated, the cmTent account deficit doubled to 4.3% of Gross National 
Product (GNP), the external debt service ratio reached 28% of export earnings, 
and foreign exchange reserves fell by half to $438 million, equal to less than 
three weeks of imports. 1 
These developments have eroded the ability of the government to affect the 
country's development process. In fact, the encouragement of private sector 
activity, particularly investment, is the only viable option open to the authori-
ties. It follows that for policy purposes the most important issue involves 
restructuring government expenditures and their financing in a manner that 
would provide the maximum inducement to private sector capital formation, 
especially in manufacturing. Operationally, this means finding an optimal 
balance between the Government's three most important budgetary items: 
defense, public consumption and infrastructural development. What is more 
important, because there is abundant evidence2 th~t the government's deficits 
have crowded out a certain amount of private investment, the authorities must 
achieve this balance within the context of a reduced level of expenditures and/or 
tax increases. 
Defense expenditures are an obvious candidate for expenditure reductions. As 
noted in the next section, the country's defense burden is one of the heaviest in 
the world. At round 7% (1992) of GNP, it is more than twice that of India. 
Moreover, while during most of the 1980s worldwide defense expenditures 
contracted, Pakistan's expanded. This trend occ.urred even after the hostilities in 
Afghanistan had subsided. 
While the defense expenditure to GNP ratio has remained about the same, 
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debt servicing has overtaken this category as the single largest item or !!owrn-
ment spending. In 1971 this item was 3% of GNP; by 1993-94 it had ~isen lo 
8.2%. During the fiscal year 1994-1995, debt servicing will account for 8.2'ii or 
35% of total budget spending,3 compared with 26.4% for defense . .i Appareml\' 
the government recognizes the burden that defense expenditures have placed 0 ;1 
the economy. For the 1994-1995 budget, defense expenditure will in~reasc onlv 
8.6% whereas in the previous year India increased defense expendilurl.!s b~· 
20%.5 . 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine Pakistan· s 
macroeconomic economic prospects for the remainder of the 1990s. In parlirnlar 
(and assuming it politically possible), we are interested in examining the srnpc 
for stimulating economic growth and expansion through restrained allocations lo 
the military.6 What impacts have defense expenditures had on the economy'? Arc 
these impacts largely direct or have they operated primarily through their effect 
on the budgetary deficits? In this regard, defense expenditures are a logical arca 
for budgetary cuts: current expenditures account for the major part or govern-
ment budgetary allocations, averaging 65-75% during most of the eighties and 
into the 1990s. Since the late 1980s, defense expenditures together with dchl 
servicing have accounted for around 80% of current expenditures. 
Previous studies on defense spending and the macroeconomy 
Intuitively, one might imagine that increased defense expenditures over timc 
would be detrimental to an economy. The classical argument is that soldiers and 
armaments do not create goods and services that can be consumed hy others: 
thus, military spending necessarily subtracts from a nation's total resources. 
Following this line of argument reductions in arms expenditures should provide 
a sizable peace dividend that could be used for development purposes.7 
The issue is not so clear-cut, however. There is another side to the <lchate. 
offered by those who emphasize the economic benefits of defense expencJitures. 
Advocates of "military Keynesianism"8 stress the advantages of using domestic 
defense expenditures as a mechanism for stimulating the economy, and thus 
increasing the overall rate of economic growth. Unfortunately there is ampk 
empirical evidence to support each assertion.9 
A balanced position on the defense versus growth controversy is that whik 
economic benefits should result from reductions in military spending, there is 
nonetheless uncertainty as to the likely size and distribution of these henclih 
over time. Reductions in government spending on the military will ha,·c 
significant macroeconomic effects, particularly upon interest rates, exchange 
rates and trade patterns, all of which will influence the size and distribution of 
gains from cuts in military expenditures. Furthermore, there is consi<lcrabk 
concern, often expressed in the popular press regarding short-term inc1:eascs in 
unemployment and a lowering of economic growth that might result from the 
deflationary effects of decreasing military expenditures. 
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With this context in mind, several studies have examined the manner in which 
Pakistani defense expenditures have interacted with various macroeconomic 
aggregates. These studies can be roughly broken into four types: 
(I) Causation Analysis where an attempt, is made to assess whether defense 
expenditures initiate economic change or, in contrast, are affected by 
changes in the macroeconomy, e.g. to increases in defense expenditure cause 
a follow on change in the economy, or instead, do economic changes result 
in movements in defense funding? 
(2) Linkage Identification where the strengths of the identified causal patterns 
are estimated, that is, how much does a rupee of defense expenditures alter 
GDP over time? 
(3) Budgetary Priority Analysis where expenditure priorities and budgetary 
tradeoffs are identified and 
(4) Modelling where, drawing on I, 2 and 3, defense expenditures are examined 
in the context of alternative fiscal packages, for example, how does varying 
the existing size of the budgetary deficit affect the manner in which defense 
expenditures affect the macroeconomy? The present study falls in this 
category. 
Causation and linkages 
The main finding 10 from analysis of the causal links between defense and the 
economy is that the impact of defense expenditures on GDP has shifted over 
time. In an earlier period (1958-1973), defense expenditures had a negative 
impact on economic growth, while in the latter period ( 1973-), this impact has 
shifted to a positive one. Specifically: 
1. The earlier negative impact appears to have been directly associated with the 
speed of increase in defense expenditures. During periods of rapid mobiliza-
tion (the arms race with India), defense expenditures had a negative impact 
on the economy. That is, increased defense expenditures during this period 
dampened the growth in GDP. 
2. After 1973 (and at a time when Pakistani defense expenditures were not 
modified by developments in India), increased growth in the economy 
provided additional resources for defense. In turn, defense expenditures 
stimulated further growth. 
3. In contrast there were no strong linkages from non-defense expenditures to 
economic growth. 
Another pattern of significance" involves the ~elationship between defense and 
non-defense expenditures. There has been a tendency over time for defense 
expenditures to lead in the timing of government allocations. That is, when 
defense expenditures change, a corresponding adjustment (again with a lag of 
several years) occurs in allocations to non-defense activities. 
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As noted above, a recurring theme in the Pakistani literature is that of 
government deficits and or expenditures "crowding out" private investment. i'hi-.. 
phenomenon has been confirmed by several recent studies 12 which found 
evidence that government activities have pre-empted funds that would othen\·ise 
have flowed into private capital formation. These patterns have also been tllL' 
subject of causality analysis. 13 Here, attention has focused on the direction of 
impact between the different broad types of public expenditures (defense. 
consumption, and general government investment) and potential sources of 
funding (deficits, domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing). Do expenditures 
create subsequent deficits and borrowing requirements or, instead, does lax fiscal 
policy and easy credit encourage expanded expenditures? The main pattern-.. 
found suggest that: 
1. Of the three types of government expenditures, those allocated to defense 
appear to have the most complex budgetary linkages. In one sense the 
military faces a hard budgetary constraint in the sense that increases in past 
deficits tend to suppress the expansion in allocations to the milit•iry. On the 
other hand, increased defense expenditures do force an expansion in future 
deficits. 
2. This general framework carried over to the borrowing patterns associated 
with military expenditures. For most measures of domestic borrowing, higher 
growth rates in funding from the domestic markets tend to suppress the 
expansion in future military expenditures. These suppressing effects arc most 
important in cases where the rate of borrowing (domestic or foreign) expands 
over its anticipated (or longer term) growth rate. Still, feedback effects are 
present whereby military expenditures are, in turn, generally funded in part 
through both domestic and foreign borrowing. 
3. Since a large portion of public consumption consists of allocations to the 
military, the budgetary patterns of this expenditure category are in some ways 
similar to that characterizing defense, particularly consumption's relationship 
to the fiscal deficit. 
4. Several important differences do occur however. The major difference be-
tween defense expenditures and public consumption is associated with the 
manner in which each is funded. Increased growth in public consun1ptiou 
definitely contributes to expanded domestic borrowing requirements mw 
time. Also, the expansion in public consumption was more constrained than 
defense during periods of expanded foreign borrowing. 
5. Of the three types of government expenditures examined, general government 
investment has the strongest impact on the public sector deficit. 
6. For all four measures of the deficit, 14 incre(lj;eS in general public investment 
tend to result in expanded fiscal imbalance. While expanded deficits (_actu'.tl 
and deviations from the exponential trend) facilitare a future expar~~1on 111 
public investment, this effect is weak compared with the impact of 111,·est-
ment on the deficit. 
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7. A clear link also exists between expanded public sector investment and 
increased future domestic borrowing requirements. Interestingly enough few 
links exist between the growth in public investment and the country's pattern 
of external public borrowing. 
While these findings do not provide a definitive proof of the existence of the 
crowding out mechanism in Pakistan, they are quite consistent with what one 
might find if the phenomena were present. Public investment and infrastructural 
development appear to have the least stimulating (and sometimes negative) 
affect on private sector investment. This is ironic given that a major purpose of 
these allocations is to provide a stimulus to follow on private investment. 
Clearly, this effect stems from the large demands placed on the domestic capital 
market by this type of expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again a somewhat ironic pattern exists by 
which expanded military expenditures provide a generally strong stimulus to 
private investment in large scale private manufacturing. While the analysis does 
not let us identify the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian demand 
expansion and/or direct linkages to the country's military procurement program), 
the fact remains that the government has shown restraint in funding defense 
expenditures once domestic borrowing begins to accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere between defense and investment 
in affecting the private sector's willingness (or ability) to commit capital to 
manufacturing. While the government does fund increased consumption through 
expanded domestic borrowing, the magnitudes involved are not nearly as great 
as with investment. Thus, government consumption is still able to provide a net 
positive stimulus to small scale private investors (who presumably are not as 
reliant on the domestic capital markets as are their larger scale counterparts). 
Budgetary patterns 
While the development of a sophisticated model for analyzing budgetary 
priorities is beyond the scope of this paper, several stri~ing patterns characterize 
Pakistani budgetary allocations: 15 
1. A clear pattern exists whereby long run defense expenditures impact nega-
tively on development. Since development does not reduce defense over time, 
defense has a higher priority than development. 
2. Defense has a positive short run affect on interest payments with increased 
shares of the budget allocated to interest neutral (in both the short and long 
run) with regard to the share of the budget allocated to defense. Again, this 
is a clear cut case of defense having the higher priority. 
3. Priorities between development expenditures and interest payments are much 
more difficult to deduce: development expeRditures reduce (in both the short 
and long run) the budgetary share going to interest payments. In turn, 
increased interest payments reduce (again in both the short and long run) the 
shares of the budget going to the capital account. 
335 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
4. Complicating identification of the development/interest priorities is the fact 
that in both cases the expected and unexpected deficit terms are negati,·e. 
Both variables are reduced with increases in the deficits. Furthermore these 
patterns occur in both the short and longer run. However, since the dl'lil"it 
terms are stronger in the case of development (with a higher level of 
statistical significance), it appears that interest payments have a sli!.!hth 
higher priority than that afforded development. ~ · 
Although the budgetary shares of the other main items of the budget were not 
directly tested against each other, it is probably safe to conclude that subsidies 
are next in priority. While their allocations suffer with increases in defense 
expenditures, they are immune from cuts due to expanded interest payments or 
development allocations. In addition, the government appears willing to run 
higher deficits to fund these programs. Administration has the next highest 
priority. This category appears is immune to cuts stemming from increases in 
defense, interest or development. In addition these allocations do not seem to 
face cuts during periods of increased deficits. · 
In conclusion, one may quibble over the importance of administration, social 
security/welfare and other expenditures. However, the general picture of Pak-
istan's budgetary priorities is fairly clear. Defense expenditures have by far the 
highest priority. While the government may cut these programs when deficits 
expand more than anticipated, the government is inclined to cut other programs'" 
rather than reduce the budgetary share going to the military. 
Modeling 
In an earlier study 17 focused on determining the rough magnitudes of the impact 
of defense (and non defense) expenditures on the major economic aggregates it 
was found that there was a generally positive link between defense and the 
economy. On the other hand, non-defense expenditures had a negative impact on 
economic growth. Given this it was found the actual impacts of defense and 
non-defense expenditures can change fairly dramatically as the economic context 
(i.e. the fiscal deficit) in which the expenditures occur varies. 
Defense and the macroeconomy 
Drawing on a 33 equation (Appendix A) policy model, 18 our main concern was 
identifying the main linkages between defense expenditures and economic 
activity. These links are assumed to be both direct (as with Keynesian demand 
creation) and indirect (through possible deficit induced crowding out of ~Jrivate 
activity and/or diversion of private savings to the public sector. Concerning the 
more important individual equations: 
I. Gross Domestic Product is affected mainly by expansion in the private. and 
public stocks of capital, employment apd military expenditures. H~re it 
should be noted that the links between GDP and non-defense expenditures 
were not statistically significant. 
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2. Employment increases with an expanded population together with incre-
ments to the stock of public infrastructure. 
3. Defense expenditures expand in line with the general size of the economy. 
However allocations to the military compete with infrastructure for funding. 
In addition, expanded levels of foreign borrowing in the previous year 
constrain allocations to the military. The same is also true for increased 
levels of indebtedness to the international institutions. 
4. Non-defense public expenditures also expanded in line with GDP. However, 
allocations to this category were reduced by short run increases in the 
defense budget. 
5. Gross national saving 19 expands with the general growth of the economy. 
However, these funds are preempted (or crowded out) by the current fiscal 
deficit, as well as the deficit in the previous year. 
6. Private investment in large-scale manufacturing followed a lag adjustment 
pattern whereby investment in any one year was undertaken to bridge the 
gap between investor's optimal and actual capital stocks. The optimal level 
of private investment was in turn influenced by defense expenditures and 
ability to attract foreign funding. Again however, this category of private 
investment was crowded out by the fiscal deficit. 
7. Private investment in non-manufacturing activities expanded with the total 
size of the economy and availability of savings. In contrast to investment in 
manufacturing however, this type of investment was discouraged by ex-
panded defense expenditures. 
8. Government credit from the monetary system was also related to past 
deficits and short run movements in defense expenditures. 
9. Inflation is largely a function of expanded credit to the public sector, 
together with movements in the international price level. 
10. Public borrowing in the domestic markets was largely a function of the fiscal 
deficit. However, the authorities' ability to borrow internationally reduced 
some of the pressures on the domestic capital markets. 
11. Public borrowing in the foreign capital markets was also largely a function 
of the fiscal deficit. Again however, increases in defense expenditures ceteris 
paribus reduced the amount of funding from this source. 
In summary the model captures the fundamental dilemma facing Pakistani 
policy-makers. Looked at in isolation, defense expenditures have tended to 
positively influence the economy. However if these expenditures are funded with 
increased levels of deficit financing, the subsequent crowding out of private 
investment may actually result not only in increased inflation, but, more 
importantly, in a net negative impact on the economy. The inability of non-de-
fense expenditures other than infrastructure to impact positively on the economy 
has only compounded this dilemma. In any case the concern of external creditors 
over the country's high defense burden will in all likelihood increasingly 
constrain allocations to the military. 
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Fiscal options 
Realistically Pakistan's fiscal options are likely to be narrowly constrained h\' 
the International Monetary Fund. In November of 1993, the government negoti-
ated an agreement with the IMF to borrow a total of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR) 1200 million ($1670 million) in a combination of concessionary ~and 
market rate loans if it implements reforms and reaches certain economil: 
targets.20 
Policy constraints and objectives 
The loans will be a combination of an enhanced structural adjustment facilitv 
that carries an interest rate of 0.5%, an extended fund facility at market rates an~I 
a public-sector adjustment loan (the $350 million standby credit approved hy till· 
IMF in September 1993 is not included in the new agreement). As part of thl' 
agreement, the government pledges to take measures to meet the following 
economic targets: 21 ~ 
I. Reach an average GDP growth rate of 6.5% over the next 3 years. GDP was 
expected to grow by 7.5% in 1994 depending on the size of the crucial cotton 
crop, compared with a record low of 3% GDP growth in 1993. 
2. Bring inflation down to 5%. The government has forecast an inflation rate of 
8% for 1994 compared with more than I 0% in 1993. 
3. Boost foreign exchange reserves. Reserves fell steadily in 1993 to reach $222 
million late that year (compared with $1000 million in January of 1993 ). 
4. Reduce the burden of foreign and local debt. In late 1993, the state owed 
$23 000 million to foreign lenders, of which $4500 million was short term 
debt. 
5. Continue the tariff, tax and financial reforms, privatization and deregulation 
policies launched in the late 1980s. 
By late 1994, the government had complied with IMF pressure by increasing 
energy prices and introducing a controversial agricultural tax as a means of 
reducing the fiscal deficit.22 Petroleum and utility prices have been adjusted 
substantially, together with the introduction of a mechanism to make domestic 
petroleum prices more responsive to changes in international prices. In addition. 
the authorities' fiscal program for 1993-1994 envisages a reduction in defense 
expenditures by about I% of GDP, along with a containment of nonessential 
expenditures.23 
The authorities have tightened monetary policy through upward adjustments in 
the rates of return and reductions in the scope of concessional and mandatory 
credit schemes. The framework for concluding effective monetary policy has 
been. strengthened through the provision of increased autonomy to the central 
bank. • · 
Finally the Pakistan rupee was de\calued by I 0% at the outset of the 
1993-1994 fiscal year. This has been followed by a series of small exchange rate 
338 
PAKISTANI DErENCE EXPENDITURES 
adjustments implying a total devaluation of I 2Ck l'is-a-1·is the US dollar and a 
real effective depreciation. 
Against these positive initiatives, the government began in late-I 994 to 
experience a number of setbacks:24 
I. During December 1994, inflation rose to l 4.3Ck from I 1 % a year earlier. This 
figure is considerably higher than the agreed 5% target to be reached by 1997. 
2. For the July-December 1994 period, net tax receipts are estimated to have 
fallen 37% short of target. The shortfall in the collection of indirect taxes 
during the period was around 36% while income tax collection is off its mark 
by 39%. 
3. Government spending which was supposed to be curtailed under the IMF 
Guidelines, was around 18% higher than over the previous July-December 
period. The situation is so critical that the government has stopped all 
ministries from issuing checks of more than RS. I 00,000 and canceled all 
development funds for December. 
4. Finally, the agricultural sector has experienced a series of setbacks. A series 
of natural disasters and poorly thought-out policies has led to a drastic 
slowdown in production. After growing by 9.5% in 1991-1992, farm output 
dropped 5.3% in the falling year. For 1994 it expanded by just 2.6%. During 
the current 12 months ( 1995), the cotton harvest may be up to 7 .5 million 
bales or up to 20% short of target. Estimates are that for every 1 million 
cotton bales lost there is a reduction of GDP growth by one percentage point. 
If this relationship is accurate, the projected GDP growth of 6.9% for 
1994-1995 could be as low as 3.5%. 
If we can assume that the government's current fiscal problems reflect primarily 
the transitional difficulties of shifting from tariffs to a general sales tax and that 
the agricultural crisis is largely a result of natural disasters, then the country 
should be able to realistically pursue its major objectives throughout the 
remainder of the 1990s. These include: 
1. A stable rate of GDP growth of between 6.0% and 7.0% per annum-this is 
in line with the average rate of growth since 1976. 
2. Employment growth of 2.8%-3.1 %-around the rate of growth of population 
and consistent with past rates of job creation. 
3. Inflation 5% or lower-somewhat below the historical range of 7-8%. 
4. Foreign borrowing to expand at a rate slower than the general expansion in 
economic activity, i.e. around 5% or less. 
5. Defense expenditure to decline to around 4-5% of GDP-down from the 
6-7% range in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
6. Government deficits to fall to 3-4% of GDP-down from the 6% figure 
reached in the early 1990s. • · 
7. A general expansion in the share of savings in GDP up toward the range of 
18-20%-typical values for countries at Pakistan's stage of development. 
8. An expanded share of private investment in GDP. 
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Alternative policy mixes 
The critical question is whether and to what extent these objectives are 
consistent and attainable. Of particular importance for the current study, arc 
the defense expenditure levels that would aid in the attainment of these 
goals. Again, using the model developed in Appendix B, several policy packages 
were examined in terms of their ability to improve the country's economic 
fortunes. 
Simulation I-No major policy initiatives. As a benchmark, the policy simu-
lation model described in Appendix A was solved with the world rate of inflation 
set at 3% per annum, population growth at 3% per annum and exports at 
constant prices assumed to grow at an annual rate of 7 .5% per annum. Here we 
are assuming no major shifts in past public expenditure or revenue decisions. 
Under these assumptions: 
I. The economy (GDP) would continue to expand in the 6.5-7.5% range, with 
defense expenditures gradually slowing to less than 5% per annum by the end 
of the century. 
2. Despite this slowing down in defense expenditures the military burden 
(defense as a share of GDP) would remain well above 6% throughout this 
period. 
3. There would be a gradual increase in non-defense expenditures as a share 
of GDP-increasing from around 16% in 1992 to 18.4% by 2000. 
This pattern reflects the rapid expansion in government consumption during 
the 1980s. 
4. Employment targets would be met with rates of growth averaging around 
3%. 
5. The savings rate would increase, but only very gradually, reaching around 
16% by the end of the century. This is well below the 18-20% assumed to 
be a precondition for self sustained growth. 
In summary: 
(a) The fiscal deficit would expand throughout this period with its share in GDP 
also reaching unacceptable rates. 
(b) Most unsatisfactory of the major indicators is the rate of inflation. With 
expenditure, savings and deficits in the ranges noted, inflation would 
increase during this period, reaching slightly over 20% by the end of the 
century. 
(c) Reflecting these patterns, the external gap would reach nearly 8% of GDP, 
a figure probably unattainable given the likely reluctance of foreign creditors 
to finance deficits of thit> magnitude. 
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Figure 1. Pakistan: alternative defense-GDP scenarios. 
Simulation 11-Alternath·e defense expenditure strategies. For most developing 
countries, a logical alternative at this point would be to determine the extent to 
which economic performance might be improved through cutting defense expen-
ditures. As noted above, however, the consequences of this approach are not 
clear. On the one hand, defense expenditures appear to provide a positive 
stimulus to the economy, while on the other the deficits associated with 
increased allocations to the military may be financed in a way that pre-empts 
funds that might flow into private investment. To assess the net magnitude of 
these effects, several alternative defense budgets were examined. In these 
simulations defense expenditures were assumed to expand at a constant rate (2.5, 
5.0 and 7 .5%) over the period to the year 2000. As a frame of reference, •defense 
expenditures averaged 7.2% over the 1981-1991 and 1986-1991 periods. Under 
these assumptions (Fig. 1): 
I. The growth in GDP begins to decline after 1994, with the rate of decline 
largely a function of the expansion in defense. 
2. With defense expenditures endogenous (determined by the model's equa-
tions-Simulation I) the deceleration in GDP growth is fairly gradual, 
leveling off at around 6.5% per annum by the end of the century. 
3. With defense expanded at a rate of 7.5% per annum it (providing there were 
no fiscal or inflationary constrains) it would be possible to stabilize the 
growth of GDP at slightly over 7% per annum. 
4. Increases in defense expenditures at a const~nt 5.5% or 2.5% would (in the 
absence of any other policy changes) causes the economy to decelerate fairly 
rapidly, reaching a growth of about 5.8 and 4.6% respectively by the end of 
the century. 
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Figure 2. Pakistan: alternative defense-private investment scenarios. 
5. The impact of defense expenditures on private investment reflected the 
anticipated pattern (Figure 2). The share of national resources devoted to 
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Figure 3. Pakistan: alternative defense-fiscal deficit scenarios. 
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Figure 4. Pakistan: alternative defense-inflation scenarios. 
6. Concerning the fiscal imbalance (Figure 3), only the deficit associated with a 
2.5% expansion in defense expenditures is likely to fall within an acceptable 
range (around 4.8% of GDP). Without simultaneous reforms in tax structure 
or collection, significant reductions in the deficit as a share of GDP are 
unlikely under any of the proposed scenarios. 
7. Finally, simply just constraining defense expenditures even at low rates of 
growth (with no other complementary stabilization measures) would most 
likely not stave off increases in inflation. As noted above, inflationary 
pressures have been building for some time. Even at an average annual 
growth of only 2.5% defense expenditures (Figure 4) it would be difficult for 
the country to reduce inflation below l 0% per annum during the remainder 
of this century. 
Fiscal options with constrained defense expenditures 
These simulations suggest that although the general rate of growth of GDP may 
increase with defense expenditures, the adverse effects associated with this 
expansion, negate any resort to a defense-led growth model. The real question 
for policy makers must center on ways of improving economic performance 
while constraining defense expenditures to lower than historic rates of expan-
sion. 
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Figure 5. Pakistan: GDP growth under alternative fiscal programs. 
Several policy packages are examined under the assumption that the 
government will gradually be forced to move to more austere programs if 
more moderate fiscal restraints fail to achieve the country's major macro-
economic objectives. Specifically Fiscal Program I outlined below would 
be one of the most mild attempts at reform. Macroeconomic objectives 
not achieved by that program suggest the modifications introduced into 
Fiscal Program II and so on. Analysis is confined to the use of policy tools 
directly under the control of the authorities-external borrowing, expenditures 
and taxes. 
Program I 
First while holding defense expenditures at a 2.5% rate of growth, the authorities 
might also constrain foreign borrowing. Given the country's current debt 
situation and the high proportion of the budget allocated to debt servicing. 
reduced rates of external borrowing are probably a good objective in and 
of themselves. Credit from this source is set to grow at 5.0% per annum. This 
rate is considerably below the average of 22% over the 1986-1991 period. 
but in line with the average of 4.6% for the 1981-1991 period as a whole. 
Program II 
To strengthen the country's acute iitfrastructural bottlenecks, this policy pack-
age would shift more resources toward public investment in transport. 
energy, communications and the like. Expanded expenditures in these areas 
would also help to offset the deflationary effects associated with the planned 
344 
PAKISTANI DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 
reductions in defense expenditures. As a starting point infrastructure invest-
ment was set at an expansion of 7.5% per annum, up somewhat from the 
6.1 % average over the 1981-1991 period and 5.1 % expansion during the 
1986-1991 period. 
Program Ill 
This set of policies would add increased revenue collection to Program II. Here, 
implementation of the agriculture tax, and better tax collection should be enough 
to sustain an increase in revenues of around 7 .5% per annum. This rate is up 
some from the 6.8% growth during 1981-1991 and 5.5% for the 1986-1991 
period. 
Program IV 
Finally the last package of reforms would modify package III by constraining 
non-defense (and non-infrastructure) expenditures to a maximum rate of expan-
sion of 7 .5% per annum. As noted above, one of the main causes of the 
country's current fiscal crisis has been an acceleration in non-defense expendi-
tures. These averaged 8.4% during 1981-1991, accelerating to 9 .4% from 1986 
to 1991. 
Of the expenditure and revenue programs noted above, those associated with 
increased taxation are likely to be the most difficult to attain. In part, this will 
be due to the likely slowdown in economic growth, but also to a fall in import 
tariff revenue, widespread tax evasion (only one million of Pakistan's 120 
million population pay an income tax)25 and the difficulties of taxing the 
country's large black market economy.26 In addition in early 1995, businesses in 
Karachi began threatening a tax strike27 unless the government restores law and 
order to that city. Given the current problems faced by cotton and sugar 
producers, there is also sufficient reason to believe that it may be some time 
before the recently enacted agricultural tax will yield significant increases in 
revenues. To put these problems in perspective, rough probabilities of the likely 
ability and political will of the government to implemented the various tax and 
expenditure programs are outlined in Figure 10. 
Main Findings 
Of particular interest is the manner in whicn these packages might improve 
economic performance over that likely to occur simply. through constraining the 
growth in defense expenditures at 2.5% per annum. 
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Figure 6. Pakistan: inflation under alternative fiscal programs. 
Growth. GDP growth gradually improves as the fiscal programs are made more 
comprehensive (Figure 5). That is, simply restraining foreign borrowing does not 
significantly improve the general rate of expansion of the economy. Nor is there 
little difference between the growth path obtained through carrying out Program 
I and that of simply expanding defense expenditures with foreign borrowing 
being determined though the model's' relationships. There are other patterns of 
interest: 
1. While Program IV yields the highest rate of growth throughout the 1990s, it 
converges with Program III by the end of the century. 
2. Program II. 
Inflation. Inflationary pressures proved relatively hard to dampen (Figure 6). 
Constraining defense expenditures to a 2.5% growth path, together with restrict-
ing foreign borrowing (Program I) and increasing infrastructure investment 
(Program II) while keeping the rate of inflation considerably below that of the 
purely endogenous forecast, were unable to put the economy on a declining 
inflation path. This leads to important policy implications: 
. . 
1. A clear ingredient of any anti-inflationary program must be tax reform. Even 
expanding government revenues at 7 .5% per annum (Program III) were not 
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Figure 7. Pakistan: the budget deficit under alternative fiscal programs. 
2. However, supplementing tax reform with constraints on non-defense expendi-
ture (Program IV) quickly suppressed inflation. This policy package lowered 
inflation below 5% through much of the period under consideration. 
Budget deficit. The pattern of budget deficits was similar to those characteriz-
ing inflation. Without tax reform, the programs were not capable of significantly 
reducing the share of the fiscal deficit in GDP. Specifically, constrained defense 
expenditures at 2.5%, Program I and Program II, all stabilized the deficit at 
around 5.0% (with Program II eventually reducing this ratio to 4.5% at the end 
of the century). 
On the other hand, fiscal performance improved dramatically with expanded 
revenues (Program III) and constrained non-defense expenditures (Program IV). 
Specifically, by 2000, Program III brought the deficit down to around 2.6% of 
GDP (Figure 7) and Program IV brought the deficit down further toward 2.0%. 
Savings. As noted, increasing the rate of national savings must be a key 
objective in any fiscal program. In this regard, all five packages produced some 
improvement in this aggregate. Again, the results (Figure 8) from the defense 
expenditure expansion of 2.5%, Program I and Program II, were fairly similar 
(with savings increasing from about 14.5% in 1992 to slightly over 17% by 
2000. 
• Tax reforms however contributed greatly to this objective, raising the saving 
rate to nearly 19% at the end of the period. Finally, c'Onstraints on non-defense 
expenditure expanded this rate a further 2% to slightly under 21 % by 2000. 
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Private investment. Finally, increasing the share of national resources invested 
by the private sector is possible under all of the programs examined (Figure 9). 
Here improvements up to around 10.2% (from around 9.2% in 1992) are easily 
obtained. As with the other macro-economic aggregates, however, a significant 
improvement in private investment depends critically on the willingness of the 
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In summing up, the fiscal pattern that developed in Pakistan during the 1980s 
and extending to the 1990s is not sustainable. Over-expansion in expenditures, 
both for defense and non-defense purposes, together with sluggish revenues and 
excessive foreign borrowing have created a situation in which further growth 
will be increasingly constrained by debt servicing, inflation, and shortages of 
domestic savings for private investors. 
However, gi¥en the complex nature of defense expenditures in both stimulat-
ing and suppressing growth, budgetary reductions in this area in, and of 
themselves, are unlikely to improve the country's economic performance. In 
fact, rapid reductions in defense are likely to impair the situation even further. 
On the other hand, modest efforts in tax reform are by far the most effective 
means of restoring fiscal stability.28 The optimal policy mix is one of tax reform 
together with defense expenditure expansion constrained in the 2.5% range. 
Unforeseen events aside, this package would enable the country to meet the 
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goals established by itself and its major creditors in restoring a rapid, sdf-
sustaining growth in an environment characterized by a declining dl'i"l'llsl' 
burden. 
Prospects 
The results summarized above are suggestive of the country's futut\' 111anll-
economic environment. They show that the country has, through fisl.·at t\•l'nn11s, 
the potential of sustaining a relatively high rate of economic expansion thrnu!!h-
out the 1990s. Combining the fiscal simulations summarized abow with' an 
(admittedly subjective) estimate of their likely occurrence, the country has. in 
most likelihood a probability of around 40% (Figure 10) of sustainin~ a stt\\I\!! 
economic expansion through the remainder of the 1990s. • 
A broader issue is whether this expansion is broad-based enough and sustain-
able to the point that the country might evolve into a dynamic Sl'llth :\sian 
Tiger. In this regard, the present South East Asian Tigers have a numhl·r l,f 
characteristics that set them apart from Pakistan and most other lk\ l' h 'Pin I! 
countries. These include:29 ' 
1. More rapid output and productivity growth in agriculture. 
2. Higher rates of growth of manufactured exports. 
3. Earlier and steeper declines in fertility. 
4. Higher growth rates of physical capital supported by higher rates of dl'Hll'sti ... · 
savings. 
5. Higher initial levels of growth rates of human capital. 
6. Generally higher rates of productivity growth. 
7. Declining income inequality and reduced poverty. 
Although Pakistan's overall-economic growth rates have been roughly l.'l'l\\par-
able to those of the South East Asian (Singapore, Malaysia, South Kl'I"t'~\ ~Uh\ 
Thailand) countries (Table B 1 ), it is apparent that the country has not lx't'n at-h.· 
to lay the foundation necessary for high and sustained growth. In parti ... ·utar: 
1. The country's savings rate is one of the lowest in the world. 
2. Export performance has been erratic. 
3. Manufacturing has not shown an ability to grow at a faster rat~ tktn th,, 
overall economy. 
4. Government consumption accounts for a relatively high share of GDP. 
5. The country's population growth rate remains relatively high. 
6. As opposed to the South East Asian countries, Pakistan would be hegi;:min~ 
its phase of high growth with an extremely high debt ratio. 
7. By most measures, Pakistan's military expenditures are consideratily ~'tr-._..,,._, 
those in South East Asia. 
Most important, the country has seriously neglected the development of h:.:m1:: 
capital. Despite rapid economic growth, there has been little improwmc-::.:t it": 
literacy, the proportion of children in school or the number of available t~a,-:."1;;:-N--
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The unequal distribution of human capital, in turn, has created an income 
distribution much more unequal than that found in South East Asia. Most 
analysts feel that the success of the South East Asian economies is liked to their 
initial, equitable distribution of income and assets. 
Given the budgetary constraints that the government is likely to be faced with 
during the remainder of the decade, it is difficult to see how the country could 
significantly improve its social infrastructure. Without these human assets and 
capabilities, the country will be unable to achieve the productivity increases 
necessary to transform itself along the lines of the South East Asian model. 
Appendix A 
Table Al. Pakistan: Defense and the Macroeconomy, Simulation Model, 1973-
1991 
(constant 1985 prices) 
Structural equations 
(1) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
GDP= - 53.4 + 1.70 K + 1.59 GK+ 6.38 EMP - 1 + 3.21 MILX 
( - 1.55) (9.42)t (2.8l)t (5.25)t (2.75)t 
r2(adj) = 0.998; SE= 5.94; DW = 1.96; F = 2280.7t 
(2) Employment (EMP 
EMP = 3.05 + 0.42 EMP - i + 0.12 POP+ 0.04 IGT - 1 
(2.93)t(2.13)t (2.70)t (2.19)t 
r2(adj) = 0.994; SE= 0.28; OW= 2.82; Durbins H = - 3.33; F = 
907.8t 
(3) Defense Expenditures (MILX) 
MILX= -4.77 +0.13 ODP- 1 -0.24 IGTP~ 1 -0.23 BORFP-1-0.14 POii ( - 1.32) (6.49)t ( - 3.08)t ( - 2.44)t ( - 2.08)t 
r2(adj) = 0.990; SE= 1.11; DW = 1.66; F ~ 403.2t 
(4) Non-Defense Public Expenditures (NILX) 
NILX= -29.71 +0.23 GDP- 1-2.81 LIMl.LX-1 
( - 7.0l)t (19.74)t ( - 2.50)t 
r2(adj) = 0.964; SE= 5.838; DW = 1.74; F = 229.61* 
(5) Gross National Savings (GNS) 
GNS= -30.12+0.18 GDP- 1-0.73 GDEF -0.71 GDEF-1 
( - 5.08)t (10.88)t ( - 2.35)t ( - 2.41)t 
r2(adj) = 0.944; SE= 5.96; DW = 2.21; F= 96.15t 
(6) Total Public Investment (IGT) 
IGT = 6.81+0.47 IGT - 1 +1.04 IGGT 
(3.31 )t(3.68)t (3.39)t 
r2(adj) = 0.951; SE= 2.37; DW = 2.61; Durbins H= - 1.76; F= 
144.30 
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(7) General Government Investment (IGGT) 
IGGT = 3.08 + 0.71 IGGT - 1 + 0.23 IPMT 
(2.77)t (5.47)* (2.ll)t 
r2(adj)=0.951; SE= 1.02; DW= 1.81; Durbins H=0.46; F= 
167.05 
(8) Total Public Revenue (GRT) 
GRT = - 20.77 + 0.21 GDP -1 + 0.26 AGDP - 1 
( - 9.27)* (25.25)* (2.35)t 
r2(adj)=0.941; SE=2.87; DW= 1.85; F=906.67i 
(9) Public Domestic Borrowing (BORD) 
BORD= 12.99 + 0.73 GDEF - 1 - 0.91 BORF 
(4.00)* (5.10)* ( - 2.91)t 
r2(adj) = 0.610; SE= 5.27; DW = 2.37; F = 14.30* 
(10) Public Foreign Borrowing (BORF) 
BORF = 14.74 + 0.48 GDEF + 0.27 GDEF - 1 - 0.59 MILX 
(8.40)* (4.13)* (2.48)t ( - 6.02)* 
r2(adj) = 0.715; SE= 2.30; DW = 1.91; F= 15.19* 
(11) Private Investment in Large-Scale Manufacturing (IPML) 
IPML = - 4.37 + 0. 78 IPML- 1 - 0.07 BORD- 1 + 0.24 MILX- 1 + 0.13 BORF 
( - 3.36)* (5.96)* ( - 2.63)t (3.75)* (2.66)t 
r2(adj) = 0.990; SE = 0.59; DW = 1.99; Durbins H = - 0.54; F = 
413.6* 
(12) Private Investment in Small-Scale Manufacturing (IPMS) 
IPMS = 0.02 + 0.85 IPMS- 1 - 0.006 BORD + 0.007 NILX 
(0.43) (8.87)* ( - 2.82)t ( - 4.26)* 
r2(adj) = 0.994; SE= 0.05; DW = 2.12; Durbins H = - 0.93; F = 
934.7* 
(13) Private Investment in Non-Manufacturing (IPNMT) 
IPNMT = 2.39 + 0.07 GDP - 0.36 MILX + 0.08 GNS 
(3.06H (7.54)* ( - 3.31H (3.24)* 
r2(adj) = 0.987; SE= 0.81; DW = 1.75; F= 415.55* 
(14) Total Public External Debt (PDF) 
PDF= 14.27 + 0.43 PDF - 1 + 1.05 IGT + 9.96 ABORF-1 
(1.52) (2.84)t (4.13)* (2.37)t 
r2(adj) = 0.874; SE= 6.43; DW = 2.14; Durbins H= - 0.78; F= 
40.20i 
(15) Public External Debt to International Institutions (POii) 
POii = - 10.78 + 0.97 PDIL 1 + 1.05 IGGT 
( - 3.47)* (13.57)* (3.13)* 
r2(adj) = 0.990; SE= 2.51; DW = 2.28; F = 869.97* 
• 
(16) Imports (ZN) 
ZN= - 24.78 + 0.35 GDP- 1 - 2.37 REALEX + 0.96 LlIGTP 
( - 1.99)* (21.55)* ( - 2.37)t (2.15)t 
r(adj) = 0.983; SE= 5.98; DW = 1.60; F = 271.41* 
352 
PAKISTANI DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 
(17) GDP Deflator (GDPDF) 
GDPDP= 0.081 +0.73 GDPDF- 1 +0.0016 MSGC- 1 +0.076 UVZ 
(3.25)* (13.24)* (5.50)* (2.50)t 
r(adj) = 0.998; SE= 0.02; DW = 2.07; Durbins H = - 0.69; 
F=2753* 
(18) Government Credit from the Monetary System (MSGCP) 
MSGCP = 28.20 + 1.70 GDEF- 1 + 1.73 GDEF- 2 + 11.49 LIMILXP- 1 
(3.26)* (2.50)t (2.39)t (3.81)* 
r(adj) = 0.842; SE= 16.44; DW = 1.96; F = 24.96* 
(19) Government Expenditures (GD) 
GE= MILX + NILX 
(20) Government Deficit (GDEF) 
GDEF=GE-GR 
(21) Change in GDP (LI GDP) 
LI GDP=GDP-GDP- 1 
(22) Lagged Change in Defense Expenditures (LI MILX- 1) 
LIMILX-1 = MILX-1 - MILX-2 
(23) Nominal Public Sector Credit from the Financial System (MSGC) 
MSGS = MSGCP X GD PDF 
(24) Real Exchange Rate (REALEX) 
REALEX = EXR X UVZ/GDPDF 
(24) Private Investment in Manufacturing (IPMT) 
IPMT = IPML + IPMS 
(25) Total Private Investment (IPT) 
IPT = IPMT + IPNMT 
(26) Private Capital Stock (PK) 
PK = IPT + IPT - 1 + IPT - 2 
(27) Public Capital Stock (GK) 
GK=IGGT+ IGGT- 1 + IGGT- 1 
(28) External Gap (EGAP) 
EGAP = EP + NFP - ZN 
Exogenous 
(29) Population (POP) 
(30) Exchange Rate (EXR) 
(31) Import Price Index (UVZ) 
(32) Exports (EP) 
(33) Net Factor Payments (NFP) 
Notes: Two stage least squares estimations. See: SORITEC Integrated Econometric 
and Statistical Analysis Language, Version 6.6 Reference Manual (Springfield, 
Virginia: Soritec Group 1993) for a description of the procedure. r2(adj), adjusted 
coefficient of determination; SE, Standard Error of Regression; DW, Durbin Watson 
Statistic; Durbins H, Durbin's H Statistic; F, F Statistic; LI, year-to-year difference; 
( ), t-statistic; *, significant at the 90% level, tsignificant at the 95% level; t 
significant at the 99% level. 
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Appendix B 
Table Bl. International comparisons of economic and social performance 
Region 
Measure Total SE Asia S Asia Pakistan 
Economic Performance (% growth) 
Gross Domestic Product, 1970-1980 4.9 8.2 4.1 4.9 
Gross Domestic Product, 1980-1991 2.8 7.5 5.2 6.1 
Investment, 1970-1980 6.5 10.0 7.3 3.7 
Investment, 1980-1991 0.3 7.8 4.0 5.6 
Exports, 1970-1980 4.0 7.9 2.3 0.7 
Exports, 1980-1991 4.7 10.7 7.9 9.9 
Government expenditures, 1970-1979 8.1 9.4 5.9 7.4 
Government expenditures, 1981-1991 0.8 4.9 5.0 7.0 
Population, 1970-1980 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.1 
Population, 1980-1991 2.5 1.8 2.2 3.1 
Economic structure (% GDP) 
Investment, 1970 21.7 28.0 17.3 16.0 
Investment, 1991 20.5 37.8 20.7 19.0 
Savings, 1970 18.6 20.3 13.7 9.0 
Savings, 1991 14.0 36.3 14.7 12.0 
Private consumption, 1970 69.I 67.8 76.0 81.0 
Private consumption, 1991 72.2 52.5 73.7 75.0 
Exports, 1970 22.7 43.3 13.3 8.0 
Exports, 1991 28.5 83.3 17.7 16.0 
Resource balance, 1970 -2.7 -7.5 -3.7 -7.0 
Resource balance, 1991 -6.8 -1.5 -6.0 -7.0 
Government consumption, 1970 13.8 12.3 10.3 10.0 
Government consumption, 1991 13.9 11.5 11.7 13.0 
Manufacturing, 1970 14.2 17.3 16.0 16.0 
Manufacturing, 1991 15.2 28.0 16.3 17.0 
Infrastructure investment (% growth) 
Paved roads, 1970-1980 8.6 8.5 5.6 4.4 
Paved roads, 1980-1990 3.0. 4.8 5.3 8.6 
Irrigated land, 1970-1980 4.5 2.5 1.6 1.3 
.Irrigated land, 1980-1990 2.4 1.5 1.0 1.5 
Electric generating capacity, 1970-1980 8.9 11.8 6.6 8.3 
Electric generating capacity, 1980-1990 6.2 7.9 IO.I 10.0 
Debt(%) 
External debt/exports, 1980 152.4 90.7 156.l 208.8 
External debt/exports, 1991 392.3 65.4 250.4 244.9 
External debt/GDP, 1980 40.9 34.2 33.5 42.4 
External debt/GDP, 1991 82.5 33.7 50.7 50.I 
Debt service/exports, 1980 17.3 15.0 13.1 17.9 
Debt service/exports, 1991 21.0 9.5 21.9 21.I 
Military (average% share) 
Defense expenditures/budget, 1970-1980 15.2 22.0 17.7 29.5 
Defense expenditures/budget, 1980-1991 16.1 18.9 17.0 26.2 
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Table Bl. Continued. 
Measure Total 
Arms imports/total imports, 1970-1980 8.5 
Arms imports/total imports, 1980-1991 17.7 
Defense expenditures/GDP, 1970-1980 5.6 
Defense expenditures/GDP, 1980-1991 5.3 
Armed forces/1000 population, 1970-1980 7.1 
Armed forces/1000 population, 1980-1991 8.0 
Social 
Population per physician, 1970 15,470.4 
Population per physician, 1990 10,570.2 
Life expectancy (years), 1991 60.4 
Illiteracy (%), 1991 37.4 
Malnourished (%), 1991 25.4 
Education (% relevant age group in school) 
Primary school, 1970 71.9 
Primary school, 1990 87.5 
Secondary school, 1970 20.8 
Secondary school, 1990 39.8 
Tertiary school, 1970 8.1 
Tertiary school, 1990 10.8 
Primary pupil/teacher ratio, 1970 38.5 
Primary pupil/teacher ratio, 1990 35.4 
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Sources: Economic/Social, World Bank. Military, United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. 
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